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EXAMINING AN UNDERDEVELOPED 
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD: TRIAL IN 
ABSENTIA AND THE RELINQUISHMENT 
OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S RIGHT 
TO BE PRESENT 
EUGENE L. SHAPIRO* 
 The right of a criminal defendant to be present at trial has been 
characterized by the Supreme Court as “one of the most basic rights” 
guaranteed by the Constitution, and yet the Court has only intermittently 
discussed the constitutional standard for assessing its relinquishment.  
Both federal and state courts now perceive that the constitutional standard 
only requires a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver, and they 
frequently focus upon the issue of the voluntariness of a defendant’s 
absence.  A large number of the federal circuits have supplemented this 
constitutional standard with a non-constitutional, supervisory 
requirement that a trial court balance the individual and governmental 
interests involved before proceeding with trial in absentia.  This approach 
has not commended itself to a majority of the state courts which have 
considered it. 
This article discusses the evolution of relinquishment analysis in the 
Supreme Court and the development in the federal courts of this non-
constitutional, prudential methodology.  It then concludes that there is a 
need to refine the constitutional standard for assessing a potential 
relinquishment of the right to be present, so that both the individual and 
societal interests involved are more adequately accommodated. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In light of the central position occupied in our adversarial system by 
a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to be present at trial,1 the 
intermittent attention paid by the Supreme Court to the relinquishment 
of the right is striking.  The slow pace of doctrinal evolution in the area 
would seem, in part, to be the product of several factors.  The case 
which has emerged as the Court’s most influential statement on the 
right, Diaz v. United States, was decided in 1912.2  It directly recognized 
the validity of a relinquishment of the right by a defendant who 
voluntarily absented himself from trial, observing that such absence 
“operates as a waiver of his right to be present.”3  The next century was 
marked by two significant developments.  One reduced the frequency of 
judicial challenges alleging the right’s abridgement in federal cases, and 
the other injected uncertainty into the determination of the proper 
analysis for assessing a relinquishment of the right. 
In 1944, Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
reflected the above-stated conclusion of Diaz while, at the same time, 
delineating the circumstances under which a defendant’s voluntary 
absence from trial “shall be considered” a waiver.4  Thereafter, federal 
courts most frequently focused upon the reach of the federal rule, often 
rendering a constitutional discussion unnecessary or at times seemingly 
peripheral.  A second important post-Diaz development, which posed 
fundamental doctrinal questions concerning the relinquishment of a 
defendant’s right to be present, occurred in 1970.  The Supreme Court’s 
significant, if predictable, conclusion in Illinois v. Allen—that a 
disruptive defendant may relinquish his or her right to be present at 
trial—employed an approach that appeared to reflect a concept 
involving the defendant’s forfeiture of the right, rather than traditional 
waiver analysis.5  There was an emphasis in Allen upon the importance 
of the state’s interests,6 and this characteristic of the opinion will be 
discussed below. 
 
1. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142 (1992). 
2. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912). 
3. Id. at 455. 
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 advisory committee notes n.1–3 (1944).  Rule 43 was rephrased, 
effective December 1, 2011, retaining the consequence that the right to be present is waived 
by a defendant who is voluntarily absent from trial.  See infra note 96 and accompanying text 
(discussing the current text). 
5. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346–47 (1970). 
6. Id.  
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In 1972, the Court briefly appeared to be poised to closely scrutinize 
the relinquishment of the constitutional right to be present at trial when 
it granted certiorari in Tacon v. Arizona7 to consider questions that the 
Court characterized as involving “constitutional limits on the States’ 
authority to try in absentia a person who has voluntarily left the State 
and is unable, for financial reasons, to return.”8  While serving in the 
Army in Arizona, defendant Tacon had been charged with a state felony 
for the sale of marijuana.9  After he was discharged from the service and 
went to New York, he asserted that he lacked the funds to return to 
Arizona for trial.10  The trial proceeded in his absence, as authorized by 
state law, and Tacon was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of 
five to five and a half years.11  Certiorari was granted to consider four 
questions: whether a felony defendant can be tried “completely in 
absentia”; whether a felony defendant can “be held to have voluntarily 
waived his right to be present at his trial without a hearing” and express 
findings on the issue; whether a felony defendant can “be deprived of 
[the] right . . . because he is too impoverished to afford travel expenses 
to the site of the trial”; and whether Arizona had “establish[ed] a 
knowing and intelligent waiver . . . in [the] case.”12 
In February of 1973, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of 
certiorari as “improvidently granted.”13  It concluded that “these broad 
questions were not raised by the petitioner below nor passed upon by 
the Arizona Supreme Court. . . .  The only related issue actually raised 
below was whether petitioner’s conduct amounted to a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of his right to be present at trial.”14  The Court 
concluded that this was “primarily a factual issue which [did] not, by 
itself, justify the exercise of [its] certiorari jurisdiction.”15  In dissent, 
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, stated that 
the Arizona Supreme Court’s consideration of whether the defendant 
had validly waived “his right to confrontation and to be present at the 
 
7. Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 351–52 (1973). 
8. Id. at 352 (emphasis added). 
9. Id. at 351. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 351–52. 
12. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351 (1973) (No. 71-6060). 
13. Tacon, 410 U.S. at 352. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
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trial of his case”16 raised a sufficient issue to warrant review.17  Focusing 
most extensively upon the former right, the dissenters found no showing 
of a valid waiver.18  With the Court’s dismissal of certiorari in Tacon so 
soon after its opinion in Allen, uncertainty concerning the impact of 
Allen upon the proper approach to a defendant’s relinquishment of the 
right to be present remained. 
Part II of this article will discuss the development of the Supreme 
Court’s waiver analysis in assessing the relinquishment of the 
constitutional right to be present at trial, noting the contexts within 
which the issue has been addressed.  Part III will describe the 
development in the federal courts of a non-constitutional methodology 
supplementing their implementation of Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which was enacted to embody the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion in Diaz v. United States.  More specifically, it will be 
observed that this supervisory and prudential approach, which in 
addition to considering a defendant’s waiver also balances the state and 
personal interests involved, appeared to develop in part as a reflection 
of the Supreme Court’s methodology in Illinois v. Allen.  In conclusion, 
Part IV will argue that appropriate federal constitutional relinquishment 
analysis should include both the issue of a defendant’s voluntary waiver 
and a structured consideration of interests similar to some of those now 
examined in the prevalent non-constitutional federal approach 
supplementing Rule 43. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S SIGNPOSTS ON RELINQUISHMENT: DIAZ, 
TAYLOR, ALLEN, AND CROSBY 
As previously noted, the Supreme Court’s discussion of the 
constitutional requirements for a criminal defendant’s relinquishment of 
the right to be present has not always followed a linear course of 
development.  This Part will demonstrate that the Court’s most 
consistent relinquishment analysis has focused upon the approach to a 
defendant’s waiver of the right that was employed in Diaz v. United 
States.19  As will be discussed below, in the 1970 Supreme Court Case 
Illinois v. Allen, a potential alternative approach appeared, employing a 
kind of forfeiture inquiry that highlighted the interests of the State as 
 
16. Id. at 353 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
17. Id. at 355. 
18. Id. at 354–55. 
19. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912). 
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well as those of the defendant.20  Over the years, however, Allen’s 
methodology has not developed further as an alternative constitutional 
relinquishment approach, and the Court’s reaffirmations of Diaz’s 
waiver analysis have created significant confusion in lower courts. 
Diaz involved a defendant who, while on bail, had voluntarily 
absented himself from portions of his non-capital homicide trial in the 
Philippines.21  Diaz had expressly consented to the continuation of those 
portions of the trial with his counsel’s participation.22  Following his 
conviction and unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court of the 
Philippines, he argued that he had not voluntarily waived his right to be 
present, that the right was not waivable, and that the trial court had 
lacked the power to proceed.23 
The case presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to 
assess the application of the congressional enactments that governed the 
matter in the Philippines, and to address the prevailing policies 
concerning the relinquishment of the right to be present.  As did Diaz’s 
objections, the Court focused squarely upon the issue of waiver.24  In 
doing so, the Court addressed the question of 
whether the provision in § 5 of the Philippine Civil Government 
Act, securing to the accused in all criminal prosecutions “the 
right to be heard by himself and counsel,” makes his presence 
indispensable at every stage of the trial, or invests him with a 
right which he is always free to assert but which he also may 
waive by his voluntary act.25  
Noting that the provision’s “substantial equivalent is embodied in 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of United States” and in state 
 
20. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970); see also Sarah Podmaniczky, Order in the 
Court: Decorum, Rambunctious Defendants, and the Right to Be Present at Trial, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1283 (2012) (discussing forfeiture of the right to be present at trial and arguing that 
courts should consider the fairness of the proceedings, not the etiquette and decorum of the 
courtroom). 
21. Diaz, 223 U.S. at 444–45.  Those portions of the trial involved the examination and 
cross-examination of two government witnesses.  Id. at 453. 
22. Id. at 445. 
23. Id. at 453. 
24. Id. at 453–56. 
25. Id. at 454.  In addition to providing individual rights for Filipinos, this federal 
enactment established the governmental structure in the Philippines during the American 
colonial term.  See Donald M. Seekins, Historical Setting, in PHILIPPINES: A COUNTRY 
STUDY 1, 28 (Ronald E. Dolan ed., 4th ed. 1993). 
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constitutions,26 the Court observed, “It is the right which these 
constitutional provisions secure to persons accused of crime in this 
country that was carried to the Philippines by the congressional 
enactment.”27  Consequently, the Court found that “the prevailing 
course of discussion here may and should be accepted as determinative 
of the nature and measure of the right there.”28  The Court then stated 
that, in the case of a non-capital felony and when the accused is not in 
custody,29 
the prevailing rule has been, that if, after the trial has begun in 
his presence, he voluntarily absents himself, this does not nullify 
what has been done or prevent the completion of the trial, but, 
on the contrary, operates as a waiver of his right to be present 
and leaves the court free to proceed with the trial in like manner 
and with like effect as if he were present.30 
The Court’s conclusion rested upon strong considerations of public 
policy, which echo to this day in the judicial consideration of voluntary 
absence during trial.  Quoting an earlier view of the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia with clear approval, the Court noted that it 
was not “consonant with the dictates of common sense” to permit a 
defendant on bail “whenever he pleased, to withdraw himself from the 
courts of his country and to break up a trial already commenced.”31  The 
result of such a practice, “if allowed to be law, would be to prevent any 
trial whatever until the accused person himself should be pleased to 
permit it.”32 
In 1973, in Taylor v. United States, the Court reaffirmed the policy in 
Diaz, noting that it was the very voluntariness of a defendant’s absence 
 
26. Diaz, 223 U.S. at 454–55.  The reference to an embodiment of a “right to be heard” 
in the Sixth Amendment, id. at 454, bears a strong resemblance to the Court’s later discussion 
in 1934 in Snyder v. Massachusetts of the Due Process Clause’s “opportunity to defend,” 
which there provided a basis for the right to be present, 291 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1934). 
27. Diaz, 223 U.S. at 455. 
28. Id. 
29. Id.  The Court noted that “with like accord [authorities] have regarded an accused 
who is in custody and one who is charged with a capital offense as incapable of waiving the 
right.”  Id.  The first barrier existed “because his presence or absence is not within his own 
control” and the second because the defendant “is deemed to suffer the constraint naturally 
incident to an apprehension of the awful penalty that would follow conviction.”  Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 457 (quoting Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1899)). 
32. Id. (quoting Falk, 15 App. D.C. at 454). 
11 SHAPIRO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:34 PM 
598 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:591 
during trial that implicated Diaz’s concerns.33  It expressly rejected the 
defendant’s argument that the refined waiver requirements of Johnson 
v. Zerbst34 mandated that it be demonstrated that an absent defendant 
“knew or had been expressly warned by the trial court” that he had a 
right to be present, that the trial would continue in his absence, and that 
absence would foreclose his right to testify and confront witnesses.35  
Johnson v. Zerbst had required that an effective waiver of the right to 
counsel at trial required an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of [the] known right or privilege.”36  In Taylor, the Court responded that 
it was “wholly incredible” to suggest that the defendant, who had 
attended the beginning of trial and was free on bail, “entertained any 
doubts” about his right to be present.37  The Court added, 
It seems equally incredible to us, as it did to the Court of 
Appeals, “that a defendant who flees from a courtroom in the 
midst of a trial—where judge, jury, witnesses and lawyers are 
present and ready to continue—would not know that as a 
consequence the trial could continue in his absence.”38 
While Taylor elaborated upon Diaz’s waiver discussion only three 
years after Illinois v. Allen was decided, it did little to undermine the 
strong possibility that Allen’s quite different approach, discussed more 
fully below, might provide a separate path of analysis.  To the contrary, 
in Taylor the Court approvingly quoted from Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence in Allen, which had emphasized the state’s interest in 
proceeding: “As was recently noted, ‘there can be no doubt whatever 
that the governmental prerogative to proceed with a trial may not be 
defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial from going 
forward.’”39 
A brief observation concerning the simultaneous evolution of the 
Supreme Court’s view of the constitutional source of the right to be 
present is appropriate.  In the 1934 Supreme Court case Snyder v. 
Massachusetts,40 Justice Cardozo, speaking for the court, was prepared to 
 
33. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 18–19 (1973). 
34. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
35. Taylor, 414 U.S. at 19. 
36. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464. 
37. Taylor, 414 U.S. at 20.  
38. Id. (citations omitted). 
39. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 349 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
40. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). 
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state that a defendant’s right to be present was encompassed within the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, for “[i]t bears, or 
may fairly be assumed to bear, a relation, reasonably substantial, to his 
opportunity to defend.”41  The defendant, Snyder, on trial for murder 
and attempted robbery, had been denied permission to accompany the 
jury, the judge, and counsel to the scene of the crime.42  Citing its due 
process methodology of recognizing principles of justice “so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental,”43 the Court viewed the scope of the right to be present in 
this narrow methodological context, stating that “[s]o far as the 
Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the presence of a defendant is a 
condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would 
be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.”44  In Snyder, the 
Court concluded that the defendant’s presence at a view of the crime 
scene was not assured by the privilege to be present, as “[t]here is 
nothing he could do if he were there, and almost nothing he could 
gain.”45  Citing Diaz, Justice Cardozo observed that the right to be 
present might be lost by “consent or at times even by misconduct,”46 and 
cautioned that “[c]onfusion will result . . . if the privilege of presence be 
identified with the privilege of confrontation, which is limited to the 
stages of the trial when there are witnesses to be questioned.”47  While 
“due process of law in a fair adversary process” continues to occupy a 
central position as a source of the defendant’s right to be present,48 the 
Court has since embraced the notion that both the Due Process Clauses 
and the Confrontation Clause “guarantee to a criminal defendant . . . 
the ‘right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might 
 
41. Id. at 106. 
42. Id. at 103. 
43. Id. at 105 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106, 111–12 (1908)). 
44. Id. at 107–08. 
45. Id. at 108.  The Court added that the risk of an undetected erroneous viewing was 
“so remote that it dwindles to the vanishing point.”  Id.  Snyder’s inquiry into the function 
served by a proceeding alleged to be within the right to be present continues to be important.  
See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745–47 (1987) (concluding that the questions asked of 
child witnesses at competency hearing and the potential role of defendant at that hearing did 
not implicate the right); United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526–27 (1985) (finding that a 
conference concerning impartiality of juror did not involve the right of the defendant to 
personally attend). 
46. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106. 
47. Id. at 107. 
48. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975). 
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frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.’”49 
Snyder’s contemplation of a defendant’s loss of the right to be 
present by misconduct foreshadowed the central issue of relinquishment 
in Illinois v. Allen in 1970.50  In Allen, Justice Black’s opinion for the 
Court began with an observation that “[o]ne of the most basic of the 
rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to 
be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.”51  The Court then 
framed the question before it as “whether an accused can claim the 
benefit of this constitutional right to remain in the courtroom while at 
the same time he engages in speech and conduct which is so noisy, 
disorderly, and disruptive that it is exceedingly difficult or wholly 
impossible to carry on the trial.”52 
Allen had been excluded from the courtroom at his robbery trial 
after extraordinarily abusive behavior and repeated warnings by the 
trial judge.53  His request to represent himself had initially been granted, 
and an attorney was appointed by the court to “sit in and protect the 
record.”54  During jury selection, Allen again abusively and 
disrespectfully argued with the judge about the scope of his questions, 
and the court asked standby counsel to proceed with jury selection.55  
Allen continued to talk, stating that the attorney was not going to serve 
as his lawyer, and “terminated his remarks by saying, ‘When I go out for 
lunchtime, you’re [the judge] going to be a corpse here.’  At that point 
he tore the file which his attorney had and threw the papers on the 
floor.”56  Allen was warned that another such outbreak would result in 
his removal, but the warning “had no effect.”57  His abusive remarks 
continued, he was removed from the courtroom, and the jury was 
selected in his absence.58 
After a noon recess and before the jury returned, Allen was 
permitted to return to the courtroom, where he complained about the 
 
49. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 n.15 
(1975)); see also Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526 (1985). 
50. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970). 
51. Id.  
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 346.  
54. Id. at 339. 
55. Id. at 339–40. 
56. Id. at 340. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
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procedure and his attorney.59  He asked to be present at trial and was 
told by the judge that he would be permitted to remain “if he ‘behaved 
[himself] and [did] not interfere with the introduction of the case.’”60  
When the jury returned, his attorney moved to exclude the witnesses 
from the courtroom.61  Allen objected by stating, “There is going to be 
no proceeding.  I’m going to start talking and I’m going to keep on 
talking all through the trial.  There’s not going to be no trial like this.  I 
want my sister and my friends here in court to testify for me.”62  Allen 
was again removed from the courtroom, and, except for his appearance 
for identification purposes, he remained out of the courtroom during the 
presentation of the State’s case.63  During one of these identification 
appearances, he “responded to one of the judge’s questions with vile 
and abusive language.”64  After the presentation of the State’s case, the 
judge reaffirmed his promise to Allen that he could return to the 
courtroom if he agreed to conduct himself properly.65  After giving such 
assurances, Allen was permitted to return for the remainder of the 
trial.66  It was then conducted by his standby counsel.67 
Allen’s conviction was affirmed on appeal68 and the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari.69  In a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, 
Allen then alleged that he had been deprived of his constitutional right 
to remain present throughout the trial.70  While the district court found 
no constitutional violation,71 the court of appeals disagreed.72  
Addressing the issue of waiver, it stated: 
A relinquishment of rights by waiver that is compelled by an 
election of choices is involuntary and not a waiver at all.  The 
choice given the petitioner in the instant case by the trial judge, 
 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id.  
62. Id. at 340–41. 
63. Id. at 341. 
64. Id. 
65. Id.  
66. Id.  
67. Id. 
68. People v. Allen, 226 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1967). 
69. Allen v. Illinois, 389 U.S. 907 (1967). 
70. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. at 339. 
71. United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 233 (7th Cir. 1969). 
72. Id. at 235.  
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either to behave or be expelled from the courtroom, compelled 
the petitioner to involuntarily “waive” a constitutional right.  No 
conditions may be imposed on the absolute right of a criminal 
defendant to be present at all stages of the proceeding.  The 
insistence of a defendant that he exercise this right under 
unreasonable conditions does not amount to a waiver.  Such 
conditions, if insisted upon, should and must be dealt with in a 
manner that does not compel the relinquishment of his right.73 
The Court of Appeals added that “[t]he proper course for the trial 
judge was to have restrained the defendant by whatever means 
necessary, even if those means included his being shackled and 
gagged.”74 
The Supreme Court concluded that the exclusion of Allen from the 
courtroom constituted a permissible measure for the trial judge to have 
taken.75  The Court explained its holding as follows: 
Although mindful that courts must indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the loss of constitutional rights . . . we 
explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be 
present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he 
will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he 
nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so 
disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial 
cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.76 
The Court added that the right to be present may be reclaimed when 
the defendant is willing to conduct himself appropriately.77  It stated that 
“[i]t is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that 
dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in 
our country,”78 observing that the accused may not be “permitted by his 
disruptive conduct indefinitely to avoid being tried on the charges 
brought against him.”79  In his separate concurrence, Justice Brennan 
 
73. Id. 
74. Id.  
75. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. at 347. 
76. Id. at 343 (citation omitted).  The Court also discussed permissible actions such as 
binding and gagging a disruptive defendant or citing him or her for contempt, noting the 
constitutional availability of these measures and their disadvantages.  Id. at 343–44. 
77. Id. at 343. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 346.  
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emphasized that “[c]onstitutional power to bring an accused to trial is 
fundamental to a scheme of ‘ordered liberty’ and prerequisite to social 
justice and peace.”80  
More than thirty years ago, Professor Peter Westen explored the 
distinction between the waiver of a defendant’s constitutional defense 
and its forfeiture.81  Traditional waiver analysis involved the “rigorous” 
test of whether the relinquishment of a right was “knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary.”82  Professor Westen continued, 
In other words, before the state could permanently prevent a 
defendant from asserting constitutional defenses, it had to show 
that he made a deliberate decision to forgo these defenses, that 
he made the decision after being fully apprised of the 
consequences and alternatives, and that the state itself had done 
nothing to make a decision to assert his rights more “costly” than 
a decision to relinquish them.83 
The relinquishment of a constitutional right, however, may also 
occur through a process of forfeiture.84  “Unlike waiver, forfeiture occurs 
by operation of law without regard to the defendant’s state of mind.”85  
A defendant can forfeit constitutional defenses “without ever having 
made a deliberate, informed decision to relinquish them, and without 
ever having been in a position to make a cost-free decision to assert 
them.”86  Focusing upon the forfeiture of defenses by pleas of guilty and 
rules of timing, Professor Westen concluded, 
 In sum, the analysis of forfeiture in criminal procedure is no 
different from the analysis of constitutional rights in other 
contexts: it requires one to identify the nature of the defendant’s 
interests, to identify the nature and magnitude of the state’s 
interest, and to strike a balance between the two in light of 
 
80. Id. at 347 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
81. Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional 
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977).  
82. Id. at 1214.  Professor Westen described the formulation in Johnson v. Zerbst as 
“classic”: “A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege.”  Id. at 1214 n.1 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
83. Id. at 1214. 
84. Id.  
85. Id. 
86. Id.  
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alternatives for achieving their respective goals.87 
While Professor Westen’s analysis focused upon forfeiture in these 
specific areas, the then-recent analysis in Illinois v. Allen did not go 
unnoticed.88  He found that the “real” basis for the decision was that 
the defendant “forfeited” his right to be present by his 
misconduct: that is, even though the defendant continued in his 
desire to remain in the courtroom, his constitutional right to be 
present was outweighed by the state’s overriding interest in 
being able to proceed with the trial in an orderly fashion.89 
He added that Professor Yale Kamisar had expressed a similar view 
of Allen in an unpublished memorandum in 1972.90  This view of Illinois 
v. Allen—that the non-waiving defendant’s interest in one of his “most 
basic”91 rights was weighed against the State’s obviously paramount 
interest—is inescapable from the Allen opinion itself.  The broader 
methodological question that Allen raised was the extent to which this 
interest-balancing forfeiture analysis might more generally provide an 
alternative to traditional waiver standards in assessing a potential 
relinquishment of the constitutional right to be present.   
Allen’s forfeiture approach has received scant attention from legal 
commentators.92  In a rare commentary on the matter, one treatise does 
briefly express the view that, in assessing the consequences of a 
defendant’s voluntary absence, forfeiture analysis “would seem 
preferable.”93  It is now apparent, however, that Allen’s forfeiture 
analysis has simply failed to materialize as an independent alternative 
constitutional inquiry.  It has nevertheless provided the backdrop for the 
development of a non-constitutional balancing-of-interests approach in 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, supplementing their implementation of 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43.  This development will be 
 
87. Id. at 1239.  Professor Westen made this observation in the context of discussing 
forfeiture by guilty plea.  Id.  He reached a similar conclusion with regard to forfeiture 
analysis and rules of timing.  See id. at 1254. 
88. Id. at 1239 n.50. 
89. Id. 
90. Id.  
91. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970). 
92. Instead, discussion of relinquishment is customarily confined to waiver analysis 
alone.  See, e.g., JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 21:2 (3d 
ed. 1996); 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 721 
(3d ed. 2004). 
93. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.2(d) (3d ed. 2007). 
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discussed in Part III. 
The continuing vitality of the Court’s constitutional waiver rationale 
was most recently reflected in Crosby v. United States, which did not 
address the defendant’s constitutional claim but still had much to say in 
reaffirming the significance of the 1912 Diaz opinion.94  Crosby 
presented the issue of whether Rule 43 permitted the trial in absentia of 
a defendant who is voluntarily absent at the beginning of trial.95  As 
considered by the Court in Crosby, Rule 43 provided, in part, 
(a) PRESENCE REQUIRED.  The defendant shall be present at 
the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial 
including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, 
and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided 
by this rule. 
(b) CONTINUED PRESENCE NOT REQUIRED.  The further 
progress of the trial to and including the return of the verdict 
shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to 
have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, 
initially present, 
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has 
commenced . . . .96 
 
94. Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259–60 (1993).  
95. Id. at 256.  
96. Id. at 258 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 (1990)).  Since December 1, 2011, Rule 43  
states:  
(a) When Required.  Unless this rule, Rule 5, or Rule 10 provides otherwise, 
the defendant must be present at:  
(1) the initial appearance, the initial arraignment, and the plea;  
(2) every trial stage, including jury impanelment and the return of the 
verdict; and  
(3) sentencing. . . .  
 . . . 
(c) Waiving Continued Presence.   
(1) In General.  A defendant who was initially present at trial, or who 
had pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, waives the right to be present 
under the following circumstances:  
(A) when the defendant is voluntarily absent after the trial 
has begun, regardless of whether the court informed the 
defendant of an obligation to remain during trial;  
(B) in a noncapital case, when the defendant is voluntarily 
absent during sentencing; or  
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In that case, Crosby had fled before jury selection at his trial with 
others for mail fraud.97  After a fruitless search and several days of delay, 
the trial court found his absence to be “knowing and deliberate,” adding 
that “requiring the Government to try Crosby separately from his 
codefendants would present extreme difficulty for the Government, 
witnesses, counsel, and the court.”98  The Court stated that “Crosby 
voluntarily had waived his constitutional right to be present during the 
trial, and that the public interest . . . outweighed his interest in being 
present during the proceedings.”99  Consequently, Crosby was tried in 
absentia and was convicted, along with two of his codefendants.100 
On appeal, Crosby argued that Rule 43 precluded the trial in 
absentia of a defendant who is absent at the commencement of trial.101  
While the Court of Appeals rejected this claim, the Supreme Court 
reversed.102  The Court unanimously found that “[t]he language, history, 
and logic of Rule 43 support a straightforward interpretation that 
prohibits the trial in absentia of a defendant who is not present at the 
beginning of trial.”103  With regard to the language and structure of the 
Rule’s limit upon those situations in which a trial may proceed, the 
Court noted that the Rule “could not be more clear.”104 
In response to the Government’s request for the Court to seek 
guidance from an examination of the law at the time of the Rule’s 
adoption in 1944, the Court concluded that such history did not support 
the Government’s position.105  It took the occasion to comment upon the 
 
(C) when the court warns the defendant that it will remove 
the defendant from the courtroom for disruptive behavior, but 
the defendant persists in conduct that justifies removal from the 
courtroom.   
(2) Waiver’s Effect.  If the defendant waives the right to be present, 
the trial may proceed to completion, including the verdict’s return and 
sentencing, during the defendant’s absence.   
FED. R. CRIM. P. 43.  
97. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 256.  
98. Id. at 257. 
99. Id.  
100. Id.  
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 262. 
103. Id.; see Gerald G. Ashdown & Michael A. Menzel, The Convenience of the 
Guillotine?: Video Proceedings in Federal Prosecutions, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 63, 97–99 (2002).  
104. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 259. 
105. Id.  
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context of Diaz, which had manifested a policy “that was codified 
eventually in Rule 43(b).”106  The Court noted that “at common law the 
personal presence of the defendant [was] essential to a valid trial and 
conviction on a charge of felony.”107  At felony trials, the right was 
generally considered unwaivable and was premised on the notion that 
fairness required that the jurors meet the defendant face-to-face and 
that witnesses testify in his presence.108  Quoting an 1851 Pennsylvania 
opinion, the Court added, “It was thought ‘contrary to the dictates of 
humanity to let a prisoner “waive that advantage which a view of his sad 
plight might give him by inclining the hearts of the jurors to listen to his 
defence with indulgence.”’”109 
Diaz, which involved a defendant who had “absented himself 
voluntarily . . . from his ongoing trial,” had authorized “a limited 
exception” which was later incorporated into Rule 43(b).110  Diaz’s 
policy against permitting a defendant to defeat proceedings “after trial 
has been commenced in his presence” was reflected in the comments of 
the Advisory Committee that drafted Rule 43,111 and the Court found 
“no reason to believe that the drafters intended the Rule to go 
further.”112  It noted, “[W]e do not find the distinction between pretrial 
and midtrial flight so farfetched as to convince us that Rule 43 cannot 
mean what it says.”113  The Court specifically noted that it expressed no 
opinion on “[w]hether or not the right constitutionally may be waived in 
other circumstances,”114 and, since Crosby’s Rule 43 claim was 
dispositive, the Court did not address his constitutional objection.115 
  
 
106. Id. at 259–60. 
107. Id. at 259 (quoting WM. L. CLARK, JR. & WILLIAM E. MIKELL, HANDBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 492 (2d ed. 1918)). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 178 (4th ed. 
1895) (quoting Prine v. Commonwealth, 18 Pa. 103, 104 (1851))). 
110. Id. at 259–60. 
111. Id. at 260; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 advisory committee notes n.2 (1944).   
112. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 260. 
113. Id. at 261. 
114. Id.  
115. Id. at 262.  For an argument that Rule 43 should be revised to embody a “public 
necessity” requirement reflecting an interest in proceeding, see Lucas Tassara, Trial in 
Absentia: Rescuing the “Public Necessity” Requirement to Proceed with a Trial in the 
Defendant’s Absence, 12 BARRY L. REV. 153, 170 (2009). 
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III. FEDERAL NON-CONSTITUTIONAL METHODOLOGY 
SUPPLEMENTING RULE 43 
A. The Approach Among the Circuits 
Just two years after Allen, federal Courts of Appeal began to 
develop a non-constitutional methodology, supplementing Rule 43 and 
incorporating a balancing-of-interests analysis.  The Second Circuit’s 
opinion in United States v. Tortora116 has provided the foundational basis 
for this prudential, supervisory doctrine, sometimes referred to as a 
“complex of issues” analysis,117 that examines a trial court’s exercise of 
discretion when deciding to proceed to trial under Rule 43(b).118  While 
Tortora’s approach has been significantly augmented in the Second 
Circuit by United States v. Nichols,119 the Tortora–Nichols approach has 
by now commended itself to most of the federal circuits. 
Tortora involved a trial of five defendants for loansharking.120  
Defendant Samuel Santoro jumped bail and was absent throughout 
trial.121  After having to accommodate the disparate schedules of the 
attorneys and the previous absences of two other defendants, the trial 
judge concluded that since Santoro had voluntarily and knowingly 
absented himself his trial would proceed without him.122  Santoro and 
John Tortora were convicted.123  Citing Diaz, the Second Circuit found 
that a defendant’s absence could waive his right to be present under 
both Rule 43 and the Constitution, if the absence occurred before jury 
selection.124  Reiterating the policy that “[n]o defendant has a unilateral 
right to set the time or circumstances under which he will be tried,”125 
the Second Circuit examined the circumstances of Santoro’s absence 
and found that his waiver was both knowing and voluntary.126  The court 
 
116. United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1972). 
117. The phrase was used in Tortora.  Id. at 1210; see infra note 134 and accompanying 
text. 
118. Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1210.  
119. United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 417–18 (2d Cir. 1995). 
120. Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1204–05.  
121. Id. at 1206.  Santoro later pled guilty to bail jumping.  Id. at 1206 n.3.  The trial was 
deemed to have commenced before Santoro’s absence.  Id. at 1206. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1207. 
124. Id. at 1208.  Tortora was, of course, decided before Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 
255 (1993). 
125. Tortora, 464 F.2d. at 1208. 
126. Id. at 1209.  When discussing such waiver, the court quoted Justice Brennan’s 
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thus concluded that “there were no constitutional constraints against the 
trial judge’s proceeding with the trial.”127  It added that the protections 
of Rule 43 were similarly waived.128 
In addition to examining the constitutional question of waiver, the 
court added a second inquiry that it deemed necessary in assessing a 
trial court’s decision to proceed in the absence of the defendant: 
 It is obviously desirable that a defendant be present at his 
own trial.  We do not here lay down a general rule that, in every 
case in which the defendant is voluntarily absent at the 
empanelment of the jury and the taking of evidence, the trial 
judge should proceed with the trial.  We only hold that this is 
within the discretion of the trial judge, to be utilized only in 
circumstances as extraordinary as those before us.  Indeed, we 
would add that this discretion should be exercised only when the 
public interest clearly outweighs that of the voluntarily absent 
defendant.  Whether the trial will proceed will depend upon the 
trial judge’s determination of a complex of issues.  He must 
weigh the likelihood that the trial could soon take place with the 
defendant present; the difficulty of rescheduling, particularly in 
multiple-defendant trials; the burden on the Government in 
having to undertake two trials, again particularly in multiple-
defendant trials where the evidence against the defendants is 
often overlapping and more than one trial might keep the 
Government’s witnesses in substantial jeopardy.129 
In a footnote, the court noted, “It is difficult for us to conceive of 
any case where the exercise of this discretion would be appropriate 
other than a multiple-defendant case.”130 
Weighing these issues in determining whether the circumstances 
were “extraordinary” enough to proceed, the Second Circuit found the 
trial judge to have been “well within his discretion in refusing to adjourn 
 
concurrence in Allen: “[T]here can be no doubt whatever that the governmental prerogative 
to proceed with a trial may not be defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial 
from going forward.”  Id. at 1209 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 349 (1970) 
(Brennan, J., concurring)). 
127. Id. at 1209. 
128. Id. at 1210 n.6.  The court stated, “The rule is no more than a restatement of the 
defendant’s constitutional rights.”  Id. 
129. Id. at 1210 (footnote omitted). 
130. Id. at 1210 n.7. 
11 SHAPIRO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:34 PM 
610 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:591 
the trial” or to sever Santoro’s case.131  The court also considered the fact 
that numerous delays had already occurred due to the difficulty of 
coordinating the attorney’s conflicting schedules and because of 
defendants’ “unsubstantiated claims of physical ailments” resulting in 
absences from trial.132  It added that one witness had been threatened 
and that the potential danger to that witness “would have continued 
until that indefinite time in the future when [his] testimony in the second 
trial would have been completed.”133  The “complex of issues” 
considered by the trial court thus supported the exercise of its discretion 
to proceed in Santoro’s absence.134 
In 1995, in United States v. Nichols, the Second Circuit made it clear 
that Tortora’s balancing analysis must include a sufficient assessment of 
the public interest in proceeding under the circumstances of the case.135  
In that case, defendant Howard Mason had been convicted of federal 
crimes relating to his ordering the death of a police officer.136  After 
having attended the proceedings for jury selection and only one day of 
the trial.137  Mason refused to attend the remainder, wishing instead to 
return to his cell.138  The trial court conducted a competency hearing, 
concluded that Mason was competent to stand trial, and proceeded in 
his absence.139  On appeal, Mason argued that the court had not secured 
a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to be present.140  The Second 
Circuit found that the trial court did not err in finding both the 
defendant’s competency to stand trial and competency to waive his 
constitutional right.141  It found Mason’s waiver of his right to be present 
under both Rule 43 and the Constitution to be knowing and voluntary, 
noting that “the district court took great pains . . . to inform Mason of 
the benefits of attending trial.”142  The court continued: 
On November 28, 1989, when Mason first declared his intention 
 
131. Id. at 1210. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id.  
135. United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 417–18 (2d Cir. 1995). 
136. Id. at 406. 
137. Id. at 407–08. 
138. Id. at 408.  
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 405–06. 
141. Id. at 411, 416. 
142. Id. at 417. 
11 SHAPIRO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:34 PM 
2012] TRIAL IN ABSENTIA 611 
to remain in his holding cell, Judge Korman even went down to 
Mason’s cell to convince him to reconsider his decision.  There, 
he admonished Mason that a trial cannot stop just because a 
defendant does not wish to participate.  He emphasized that by 
attending trial Mason could suggest questions to his lawyer for 
cross-examination of witnesses cooperating with the government.  
Judge Korman even indicated that, if at any time during trial 
Mason needed time to confer with his lawyers about witness 
cross-examination, the court would take a recess. . . .  On 
November 29, Judge Korman added that Mason’s lawyer was 
doing a competent job attacking the government’s evidence, 
implying that Mason’s aid might help tip the balance in his favor.  
On that day, Judge Korman also conveyed to Mason that he had 
a right to attend trial, stating that Mason was “entitled to the 
opportunity to participate.”143 
Proceeding to Tortora’s balancing inquiry, the court noted that it 
had since clarified that a trial court “has ‘broad discretion’ to proceed 
with trial even in single-defendant cases.”144  After reiterating the 
specific issues to be considered under the language of Tortora, the court 
stated that “a district court generally acts within its discretion if it 
proceeds with trial when the defendant’s absence is a product of sheer 
willfulness.”145  The court also noted that “[w]hile there are 
circumstances in which it would be impermissible for a court to proceed 
with trial,”146 there is “usually sufficient justification to do so . . . if the 
court finds the defendant to have engaged in ‘stonewalling and other 
misconduct’ . . . or if ‘there is no reasonable likelihood that the trial 
could soon proceed with the defendant present.’”147  Giving “due regard 
to the circumstances of the waiver,”148 the court then observed that the 
district court had viewed Mason as “defiant and uncooperative,” itself 
adding that “Mason’s only explanation for his nonattendance was 
 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 418. 
145. Id. 
146. Id.  As an example, the court cited United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 37 (2d 
Cir. 1989), which it characterized parenthetically as “holding it impermissible to proceed in a 
single-defendant case where [the] court was informed that defendant’s absence because of 
police detention would likely be brief.”  Nichols, 56 F.3d at 418. 
147. Nichols, 56 F.3d at 418 (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 250–51 (2d 
Cir. 1986)). 
148. Id. at 418. 
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indifference to and disdain for the proceedings.”149  Consequently, it 
found that the trial court’s decision to proceed was within its 
discretion.150 
Tortora’s supervisory balancing-of-interests analysis has been 
endorsed by the First,151 Fourth,152 Fifth,153 Eighth,154 Tenth,155 and 
Eleventh156 Circuits, and has been rejected by the Ninth.157  Contrary to 
Nichols’s description of a trial court’s “broad discretion,”158 the Fifth 
Circuit has emphasized the narrowness of the trial court’s discretion.159  
In United States v. Benavides,160 the Fifth Circuit’s most influential 
opinion, the court stated that a trial judge “has ‘only a narrow 
discretion’ in deciding whether to proceed with a trial when the 
defendant is voluntarily in absentia because the right to be present at 
one’s own trial must be carefully safeguarded.”161  This characterization 
has been repeatedly reaffirmed in the Fifth Circuit.162  In Beltran-Nunez, 
while agreeing with Tortora’s “cogent” enumeration of the issues to be 
considered and expressly adding an assessment of the inconvenience to 
 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852, 857–58 (1st Cir. 1989) (adoption of Tortora). 
152. United States v. Rogers, 853 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988) (endorsing Tortora and its 
footnote about multiple-defendant trials, but noting that an erroneous trial court decision 
may be harmless).  
153. See United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 302–03 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying United 
States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1979)); United States v. Krout, 56 F.3d 643, 646 n.5 
(5th Cir. 1995) (inquiry on the record required); United States v. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d 
287, 290–91 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying Benavides); Benavides, 596 F.2d at 139–40 (adoption of 
Tortora). 
154. United States v. St. James, 415 F.3d 800, 803–04 (8th Cir. 2005) (factual findings 
required); United States v. Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278, 280 (8th Cir. 1996) (district court should 
make a record inquiry to attempt to ascertain the explanation for absence).  
155. United States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 879 (10th Cir. 1991) (endorsement of Tortora 
reiterating its footnote about multi-defendant trials), overruled on other grounds by United 
States v. Flowers, 464 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2006).  
156. United States v. Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306, 1312–14 (11th Cir. 2001) (application of 
Tortora and Nichols). 
157. United States v. Houtchens, 926 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1991) (review limited to 
factual finding that defendant knowingly and voluntarily failed to appear). 
158. United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 418 (2d Cir. 1995). 
159. See, e.g., United States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137, 139–40 (5th Cir. 1979). 
160. Id. at 137. 
161. Id. at 139 (quoting Smith v. United States, 357 F.2d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
162. See United States v. Bone, 43 F.3d 669, 1994 WL 10119, at *5 (5th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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jurors as a factor,163 the court also observed, 
 Of course, had an inquiry before the trial proceeded 
established for the record that the defendant had deliberately 
absented himself and that there was no reasonable probability he 
could be located shortly, we would be loath to say that the 
district court would have abused its discretion by failing to delay 
or reschedule the trial.164 
As in Nichols, the reasonable prospect that the defendant may soon 
participate often weighs heavily in the balance.165  In United States v. 
Bradford,166 the Eleventh Circuit discussed Nichols and observed that 
“[w]hether the district court’s discretion is characterized as broad or 
narrow,” it agreed with the Second Circuit “that a defendant’s 
obstructionist and willful behavior, and its effect on the orderly 
administration of the court’s docket and the trial at hand, implicate a 
compelling public interest.”167 
While parallels between the supervisory and prudential Tortora–
Nichols balancing test and Allen’s forfeiture-like analysis at times rise to 
the surface in Court of Appeals’ consideration of the nature of the 
public interest, the two inquiries are of course quite different.  Judicial 
characterizations of the Tortora–Nichols test emphasize the weight to be 
afforded a defendant’s right to be present far more expressly than did 
Allen, and require a particularized assessment of the interests involved.  
Allen’s methodology nevertheless provided an influential backdrop 
against which this independent supervisory analysis developed. 
B. Consideration of Similar Approaches Among the States 
Reaction to the federal balancing test among state courts has been 
generally unreceptive.  Among those states expressly considering its 
adoption as a prudential constraint upon judicial discretion, a clear 
majority has rejected it.  Constitutional waiver analysis, inquiring as to 
whether a defendant’s absence is voluntary, has remained the principal 
 
163. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d at 290.  Tortora’s list of issues did not purport to be 
exhaustive, and the First Circuit has also expressly included a “co-defendant’s right to a 
speedy trial.”  See United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852, 858 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting United 
States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 967–68 (1st Cir. 1982)). 
164. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d at 291. 
165. Id. at 290. 
166. United States v. Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2001). 
167. Id. at 1314. 
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focus.  For example, in State v. Thomson, the Supreme Court of 
Washington considered the continuation of the drug trial of Thomson 
and his codefendant after the former’s midtrial flight.168  The trial court 
had predicated its decision to proceed upon Thomson’s voluntary 
absence and its inability to locate him.169  The Supreme Court of 
Washington stated that, in contrast to Tortora’s balancing analysis, 
Washington’s “voluntary waiver approach” governed a trial court’s 
exercise of discretion in continuing the proceedings following a 
defendant’s midtrial flight.170 
Under the voluntary waiver approach, the court only need 
answer one question: whether the defendant’s absence is 
voluntary.  A voluntary absence operates as an implied waiver of 
the right to be present.  If the court finds a waiver of the right to 
be present after trial has begun, the court is free to exercise its 
discretion to continue the trial without further consideration.171 
The court emphasized the need for a sufficient inquiry and a 
“preliminary finding of voluntariness,” as well as the requirement that a 
defendant must be afforded “an adequate opportunity to explain his 
absence” when he is in custody and before sentence is imposed.172  As 
Thomson’s absence remained unexplained, the trial court had not 
abused its discretion.173  Decided before Nichols, Thomson noted that it 
regarded the federal approach as permitting the continuation of trial 
“only in extraordinary circumstances.”174 
Both before and after Nichols’ augmentation of Tortora, a significant 
number of state courts have declined to require balancing because of 
their view that its restraints upon judicial discretion are inappropriate or 
even unauthorized.  A recent case reaching the latter conclusion was 
decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in 2010.175  In State v. 
Finnegan, while observing that “the issue of whether [Minnesota] should 
 
168. State v. Thomson, 872 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wash. 1994). 
169. Id.  Although the codefendant had expressed concern about a continuance because 
his speedy trial date had expired, the court did not appear to regard this fact as significant in 
its analysis.  Id. 
170. Id. at 1100–01. 
171. Id. at 1100.  Continuation of the trial is not required, however.  Id. at 1101. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. State v. Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2010). 
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adopt the federal balancing approach” was not before it,176 that court 
nevertheless disagreed in detail with the dissent’s suggestion that it do 
so, stating, 
[W]e have addressed this issue before and have never directed 
district courts to consider a second prong after they make a 
determination that a defendant is voluntarily absent from trial.  
The Second Circuit adopted its balancing approach only after 
determining that the trial court had the discretion to decide 
whether proceedings should be held even where the court had 
determined the defendant was voluntarily absent.  We have 
never held that a district court is to address a second prong 
involving a “complex of issues” after determining a defendant is 
voluntarily absent from trial.  Rather, under our precedent, a 
determination that a defendant was voluntarily absent from trial 
ends the analysis of whether the trial must continue.177 
Although Rule 26.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal 
Procedure178 was worded similarly to federal Rule 43, and the dissent 
urged that the state rule be interpreted as affording a trial court similar 
discretion as to whether to proceed,179 the court replied, “Regardless of 
how federal courts have interpreted federal rules, our precedent gives 
effect to the word ‘shall’” by mandating that a trial court continue after 
its determination that a defendant “is voluntarily absent.”180  The 
Supreme Courts of New Jersey,181 Pennsylvania,182 Hawaii183 and 
 
176. Id. at 248 n.3. 
177. Id. (citation omitted). 
178. The version of Rule 26.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect at 
the time of Finnegan’s trial, according to Justice Meyer’s dissent in Finnegan, provided, in 
pertinent part, for the following:  
(2)  Continued Presence Not Required.  The further progress of a trial to and 
including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be 
considered to waive the right to be present whenever:  
1. a defendant voluntarily and without justification absents himself or 
herself after trial has commenced. 
Id. at 258 n.1 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
179. See id. at 258–59.  
180. Id. at 248 n.3 (majority opinion). 
181. See State v. Hudson, 574 A.2d 434, 442–43 (N.J. 1990) (voluntary and unjustified 
absence permits proceeding with trial).  
182. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 712 A.2d 735, 739 (Pa. 1998).  Wilson implicitly 
declined to follow the Second Circuit’s approach, and the court noted that “even if we were to 
adopt the Tortora test,” the defendant could not demonstrate that the trial should have been 
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Connecticut,184 in considering and rejecting a balancing requirement, 
have found a voluntary waiver inquiry to be adequate.  Intermediate 
appellate courts in Idaho185 and Texas186 have agreed. 
In contrast, the high courts of New York, Delaware, and Maryland 
have required balancing-of-interests analyses.  In People v. Parker, 
considering the matter under the federal and state constitutions, the 
New York Court of Appeals initially concluded that there had been an 
insufficient showing that the defendant’s rights had been knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived.187  The court then added, 
We consider it appropriate to emphasize that even after the 
court has determined that a defendant has waived the right to be 
present at trial by not appearing after being apprised of the right 
and the consequences of nonappearance, trial in absentia is not 
thereby automatically authorized.  Rather, the trial court must 
exercise its sound discretion upon consideration of all 
appropriate factors, including the possibility that defendant 
could be located within a reasonable period of time, the difficulty 
 
delayed.  Id.  Wilson did agree, however, that the matters discussed in Tortora, while not 
exhaustive, presented “reasonable and logical issues for a trial court to weigh.”  Id. 
183. See State v. Caraballo, 615 P.2d 91, 100 (Haw. 1980).  In Caraballo, the court 
adopted what it characterized as “the majority rule set out in Diaz,” stating that “where 
defendant has voluntarily absented himself after the trial has begun, this operates as a waiver 
of his right to be present and the trial may continue as if he were present.”  Id.  Caraballo 
distinguished the court’s earlier use of the Tortora balancing test in State v. Okumura, 570 
P.2d 848, 852 (Haw. 1977), on the ground that Okumura had not been absent voluntarily 
because he required immediate medical treatment as the result of injuries incurred during an 
attempt to escape from the courtroom.  Caraballo, 615 P.2d at 100. 
184. The disfavor with which a balancing requirement has been regarded by the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut is reflected in its statement in State v. Durkin, that “we 
previously have declined an invitation to adopt the Tortora test in this state” and “[t]he 
defendant has offered no persuasive reason why the test should be embraced now.”  State v. 
Durkin, 595 A.2d 826, 832 n.10 (Conn. 1991).  Durkin had involved a probation revocation 
hearing, and the court cited State v. Drakeford.  Id. (citing 519 A.2d 1194 (Conn. 1987)).  In 
Drakeford, the court had found Tortora’s balancing to be inappropriate when the criminal 
defendant had been present in the courtroom at the time that he elected to leave.  See id. at 
1198. 
185. See State v. Elliott, 882 P.2d 978, 983 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (expressing a 
preference for Washington’s analysis in State v. Thomson). 
186. See Moore v. State, 670 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (stating that 
analysis of Benavides is not required with regard to trial court’s exercise of discretion). 
187. People v. Parker, 440 N.E.2d 1313, 1316 (N.Y. 1982).  Charged with the sale of 
drugs, the defendant had failed to appear before trial began.  Id. at 1314.  The court stated 
that “the record . . . is devoid of any evidence indicating that defendant was ever apprised or 
otherwise aware that her trial would proceed in her absence.”  Id. at 1316. 
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of rescheduling trial and the chance that evidence will be lost or 
witnesses will disappear.  In most cases the simple expedient of 
adjournment pending execution of a bench warrant could 
provide an alternative to trial in absentia unless, of course, the 
prosecution can demonstrate that such a course of action would 
be totally futile.188 
In Bradshaw v. State,189 the Supreme Court of Delaware followed a 
similar approach after noting that there was insufficient evidence of 
waiver190 during the defendant’s absence when his unauthorized counsel 
agreed to permit the court to give an Allen charge191 and when the 
charge was given.192  Observing that Rule 43 of the Delaware Superior 
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure “was modeled after Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 43, so precedent regarding that rule is germane,”193 
the court added, 
[W]e cannot say that Bradshaw’s absence prevented “[t]he 
further progress of the trial. . . .”  When a defendant is 
voluntarily absent, federal courts have considered a list of factors 
in determining whether the trial should proceed without a 
defendant, including “the likelihood that the trial could soon 
take place with the defendant present; the difficulty of 
rescheduling; . . . [and] the burden on the Government.”  There 
was no evidence that the trial judge or counsel on either side 
even touched upon these commonsense considerations.194 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has repeatedly required a 
balancing of the interests of the defendant and the state,195 while 
 
188. Id. at 1317 (citation omitted). 
189. Bradshaw v. State, 806 A.2d 131 (Del. 2002). 
190. Id. at 136.  The court addressed the issue of waiver solely under Delaware’s rules.  
Id. at 134. 
191. Id.  Allen v. United States permits a supplemental charge encouraging a deadlocked 
jury to arrive at a verdict.  See 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). 
192. Bradshaw, 806 A.2d at 134. 
193. Id. at 135 (footnote omitted). 
194. Id. at 136 (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1210 
(2d Cir. 1972)). 
195. See Collins v. State, 829 A.2d 992, 1001–03 (Md. 2003) (noting that trial court’s 
discretion to proceed was properly exercised when it “had no idea when [defendant] would 
become available and expressed concern that jury’s term might expire”); Pinkney v. State, 711 
A.2d 205, 216–17 (Md. 1998) (noting that both the trial court’s waiver inquiry and its 
consideration of respective interests were inadequate); see also State v. Clements, 765 P.2d 
1195, 1201 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (endorsing balancing). 
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“declin[ing] to mandate any particular list” of factors to be considered.196 
The mixed reaction to the imposition of a prudential balancing-of-
interests approach underscores the constitutional ability of state and 
federal courts to forego any inquiry beyond that of a defendant’s waiver, 
and to proceed to trial in his or her absence.197  A question remains as to 
whether this constitutional state of affairs provides a standard that is 
commensurate with the critical importance of the right to be present. 
IV.  REFINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD 
While it is evident that courts have implemented a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional right to be present by assessing its 
relinquishment as a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver, the issue 
of the voluntariness of a defendant’s absence has thus often occupied 
center stage.  Conspicuously absent from these constitutional analyses 
has been the need for any inquiry as to when a defendant’s presence 
might be secured.198  Courts have seemingly been comfortable with 
consigning the issue to the discretion of the trial court.199  Tortora–
Nichols’ prudential balancing does provide some framework for those 
courts employing it.  As for the constitutional standard, however, the 
Washington Supreme Court’s articulation of its “voluntary waiver” 
approach is generally descriptive: “If the court finds a waiver of the right 
to be present after trial has begun, the court is free to exercise its 
discretion to continue the trial without further consideration.”200  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s approach, actually foreclosing judicial 
inquiry beyond the question of voluntariness, remains unusual.201  Its 
analysis does, however, highlight the absence of a perception of any 
constitutional need for the use of judicial discretion in addressing such 
matters as a defendant’s availability. 
Perhaps the widely-used waiver standard is now as it should be.  We 
are, after all, quite comfortable with traditional constitutional waiver 
analysis, and, as there does not appear to be a trend towards 
Minnesota’s view, we are also quite comfortable with the exercise of 
judicial discretion.  A defendant’s voluntary, knowing and intelligent 
 
196. Collins, 829 A.2d at 1003.   
197. See supra notes 151–57 and accompanying text.  
198. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
200. State v. Thomson, 872 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Wash. 1994). 
201. State v. Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d 243, 248 n.3 (Minn. 2010).  
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absence from the carefully constructed legal process that society has 
developed to afford fairness might, in fact, provide an appropriate 
beginning and end to the constitutional inquiry. 
This might be an appropriate perspective if the presence of the 
defendant at a criminal trial were a characteristic of our criminal justice 
system that accrued to the benefit of the defendant alone.  That view of 
a defendant’s right to be present is, however, clearly at odds with 
widely-acknowledged properties of the right.  There are reasons why a 
criminal trial in absentia is so jarring to American sensibilities.  The 
constitutional status of a defendant’s right to be present furthers basic 
and profound societal values.  These interests demand a more searching 
standard for the relinquishment of the right than a waiver analysis alone.  
The task of refining a standard is also made more difficult by the need to 
acknowledge at the outset that the implicated values of society are 
multifaceted.  Society’s interests in affording a criminal defendant a 
right to be present are of course accompanied by the imperative that 
justice be administered in an appropriate and orderly manner.202  The 
challenge of refining the constitutional standard for assessing a 
relinquishment of the right is the challenge of adequately 
accommodating both interests. 
Common law discussion of the right to be present at trial appears to 
have focused primarily upon the benefits that the right provided to the 
defendant.  For example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s 1851 
observation in Prine v. Commonwealth,203 quoted in Crosby,204 that the 
defendants’ presence “inclin[ed] the hearts of the jurors to listen to his 
defence with indulgence,”205 was supplemented by observations that the 
personalization of the process afforded by a defendant’s presence 
required that he or she be available to discuss questions of law and 
fact,206 to “point out and argue objections to the actions of the jury,”207 to 
be heard,208 to confront accusers,209 to hear and observe jury 
 
202. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
203. Prine v. Commonwealth, 18 Pa. 103 (1851). 
204. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
205. Prine, 18 Pa. at 104. 
206. See State v. Hughes, 2 Ala. 102, 104 (1841) (Alabama Constitution was “affirmatory 
of the common law”). 
207. See id.  
208. See id. 
209. See People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842). 
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instructions,210 and to poll the jury.211  Broad Supreme Court 
characterizations of the significance to the defendant of the 
constitutional right to be present have ranged from the Court’s 
description in Allen of the right to be present as “[o]ne of the most basic 
of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause”212 to its statement 
in Diaz that “[i]n cases of felony our courts, with substantial accord, 
have regarded it . . . as being scarcely less important to the accused than 
the right of trial itself.”213 
Extending well beyond the fundamental ability of a defendant to 
avail him or herself of the attributes of the trial process, two societal 
values served by a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to be present 
stand out most prominently.  Most significant are society’s interest “in 
an accurate determination of guilt” and society’s need for “public 
confidence in the judiciary as an instrument of justice.”214  These 
characterizations of the State’s interests were set forth by the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland in quite a different context, when it considered the 
factors to be weighed in the implementation of a prudential Tortora 
analysis.215  They aptly describe the societal values served by the 
constitutional right itself.  The right to defend, personal in nature216 and 
so obviously furthered by the defendant’s presence, ultimately serves 
the critical ability of our adversarial system to determine truth.217  While 
the determination of the defendant’s culpability of course remains 
central, the authors of one commentary have added that a trial’s 
ascertaining of the truth also serves other societal goals, such as the 
identification and condemnation of wrongs that “should attract a public, 
formal response.”218  The value of public confidence in the fairness of 
 
210. See O’Connor v. Guthrie & Jordan, 11 Iowa 80, 80 (1860). 
211. See People v. Perkins, 1 Wend. 91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).  See generally 1 JOSEPH 
CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 635–36 (1847) (“[V]erdict . . . 
must, in all cases of felony and treason be delivered in the presence of the defendant, in open 
court, and cannot be either privily given, or promulgated while he is absent . . . .”). 
212. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970). 
213. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912). 
214. Pinkney v. State, 711 A.2d 205, 214 (Md. 1998). 
215. See id. at 227.  
216. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819–20 (1975). 
217. For a view of “the significance of truth as the goal of the [criminal] trial” see 3 
ANTHONY DUFF ET AL., THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL TRIAL 79 (2007).  
218. Id. at 82. 
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this process also continues to be of perennial importance.219  These 
values are inadequately served by a bare inquiry into whether a 
defendant, as an individual, has voluntarily waived his right to be 
present.  At a minimum, in addition to weighing the reasons for a 
defendant’s absence, an examination of the possibility of expeditiously 
securing his presence is warranted. 
While there is an evident need for a more refined constitutional 
standard for relinquishment, any suggested approach must afford a 
sufficiently clear framework for its implementation.  The unstructured 
nature of the Tortora–Nichols “complex of issues” inquiry makes it 
unsuited for wholesale incorporation into a constitutional test.  It is 
nevertheless possible to suggest a process for assessing the constitutional 
validity of a relinquishment, which is sufficiently structured and which 
takes into account important considerations highlighted by the Tortora–
Nichols discussion.  A trial court’s consideration should of course begin 
with waiver analysis, and a focus on the voluntariness of a defendant’s 
absence should continue to be its cornerstone.  If the standards for 
waiver are satisfied, the court should be required to proceed to the 
question of whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant’s 
presence can be secured.  Some of the facts addressed during the waiver 
inquiry might well bear upon this issue.  It is also possible that the 
prosecutor can demonstrate that there is no reasonable possibility that 
defendant’s presence might be obtained.  If this is the case, the 
constitutional standard for the relinquishment of the right should be 
deemed to be satisfied, and the trial court should be free to exercise its 
discretion as to whether to proceed in absentia.  Such judicial discretion 
on the matter would remain undisturbed by any refinement of the 
constitutional standard. 
It is of course probable that this inquiry into the feasibility of 
securing a defendant’s presence would yield little information, and that 
the issuance of a bench warrant or another less formal procedure would 
be appropriate.  Unless the prosecution can demonstrate its futility (as 
outlined above),220 or can demonstrate the presence of a compelling 
 
219. A 1998 study by the American Bar Association revealed overall confidence in the 
American criminal justice system to be surprisingly low.  See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 49–50 (1999).  Another has observed that 
perceptions of procedural fairness weigh heavily in the formulation of public confidence in 
state courts.  See Sara C. Benesh, Understanding Public Confidence in American Courts, 68 J. 
POL. 697, 699, 703–04 (2006). 
220. People v. Parker, 440 N.E.2d 1313, 1317 (N.Y. 1982). 
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need (as discussed below),221 the process of attempting to secure a 
defendant’s presence should also be a prerequisite to affording a court 
the constitutional authority to proceed in absentia. 
Recognition of limitations upon the effectiveness of bench warrants 
also compels the conclusion that this should not be an open-ended 
process.  A period of forty-eight hours would seem to be sufficient in 
order to determine whether a bench warrant or other measure is 
productive, and if the defendant is not present within that time a court 
should be free to exercise its discretion in deciding to proceed without 
him.  It is also evident from the Tortora–Nichols discussion that there 
may be unusual compelling circumstances in which the needs of the 
prosecution should permit proceeding in absentia without the delay 
occasioned by the process of attempting to secure a defendant’s 
presence.  An example would be a situation in which a witness is in 
danger.  Such compelling needs would be rare and best determined on a 
case-specific basis.  This process, as well as the court’s affording the 
prosecution an initial opportunity to demonstrate that a defendant’s 
presence cannot reasonably be obtained, provides a flexibility that 
should satisfy critics who would argue that this suggested approach is 
unworkable. 
The principal characteristic of this suggested constitutional approach 
is to move beyond the current waiver and voluntariness analyses, which 
inquire into the reason for the defendant’s absence, and require that 
attention be paid to the actual prospect of securing his appearance.  A 
shift in this direction, making adequate accommodation for the need to 
proceed with the orderly administration of justice, is clearly needed if all 
of the values embodied in the right to be present are to be adequately 
served.  While the current employment of a voluntary waiver analysis 
does present a seductive symmetry when compared with the standards 
for relinquishment of many other constitutional rights, a court’s choice 
to proceed with a trial in absentia truly does present the singular 
considerations highlighted above.  If the Supreme Court’s previous 
characterizations of the importance of the right to be present have 
significance, and if the reliability and fairness of our adversarial system 
are to be adequately furthered, a modification of the currently prevalent 
constitutional relinquishment analysis would be both appropriate and 
feasible. 
 
 
221. State v. Finnegan, 784 N.W.2d 243, 258–59 (Minn. 2010). 
